Abstract-Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is spreading across the market rapidly due to its characteristics such as low cost, flexibility implementation, and versatility of new applications etc.
Introduction
Internet and communication technologies boost and diversify the development of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) applications. Compared with traditional Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTNs), VoIP networks attract great attention since they can provide low cost, flexibility implementation and versatility of new applications. So far, more than five million peoples adopt VoIP services, which are provided by Skype, Gtalk, and iPhone etc. However, with the rapid increase of the registered users on VoIP networks, the energy cost of VoIP networks is also growth with an alarming trend. Furthermore, since the voice data transmitted over the VoIP environments are not protected, the privacy and value information of the users could be compromised easily by inactive or active attacks (Wang and Liu, 2011) .
Session initiation protocol, developed by Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), is a text-based
application layer control protocol for VoIP setup, modification, and termination among participants. (Rosenberg et al., 2002) . The architecture of the SIP is generally composed of the proxy server, redirect server, user agent, location server, and register server, as well as main network elements. Compared with other signaling protocols such as H.323, SIP is more lightweight and flexible. However, the authentication of SIP is inherited directly from HTTP Digest authentication (Franks et al., 1999) , which is vulnerable to several attacks such as impersonation attacks, off-line password guessing attacks, and server-spoofing attacks etc. In an attempt to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of VoIP communication, an energy-efficient authenticated key agreement protocol for SIP should be sought to achieve mutual authentication and key negotiation between the caller and the callee in a VoIP environment. Although several authenticated key agreement protocols have been proposed in the past years, developing an energy-efficient and secure authentication protocol for SIP is still a challenging task. This is because the green VoIP networks require the authentication protocol to satisfy both the security and the efficiency requirements. 3 To avoid time-consuming operations, the hash function is considered to be the best candidate to use in the design of security measures. Since hash operations are faster than public key cryptography, hash-based authentication protocols meet low computational requirements of green VoIP by reducing the computational energy cost significantly. However, Kilinc and Yanik (2013) demonstrated that hashed-based authentication protocols had some inherent security weakness, so these protocols were very hard to provide strong security for SIP. Several authentication protocols adopt Public Key Cryptography (PKC) to achieve strong security. In order to simplify the authentication process and reduce time consuming operations, a verification table is required to store in the SIP server's database for verification purposes in most PKC-based protocols. Although these protocols reduce the computational cost, but also arouse some issues inevitably. Compared with the protocols without using verification tables, these protocols are more vulnerable to guessing attacks, stolen-verifier attacks, and server-spoofing attacks due to the usage of the verification tables. Moreover, with the growth of the registered users the storage overhand will became very high. Furthermore, the maintenance of the large verification tables and the password updating process are all energy consuming operations. Obviously, the verification tables should be avoided when designing an energy-efficient authentication protocol for SIP. However, how to design an authentication protocol for SIP to meet both the secure and energy-efficient requirements remains a challenging work.
In this study, our main objective was to design an energy-efficient authenticated key agreement protocol for SIP without using verification tables. Since no verification table needs to store in the SIP server database, the proposed protocol could not only enhance security but also avoid the energy consumption associated with verification table maintenance. In addition, the complexity analysis demonstrated that the proposed protocol reduced the computational cost in comparison with other related work.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related work is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, the proposed protocol is described in detail. Section 4 discuses the security of the proposed protocol. In Section 5, the performance of the proposed protocol is evaluated. And the paper is concluded in Section 6. 
Related work
Since the original authentication protocol of SIP is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks and server-spoofing attacks (Yang et al., 2005) , it could not support integrity and confidentiality protection at an acceptable level for VoIP networks. Moreover, their experiment demonstrated that the computational cost on SIP proxy server was very high in the original authentication protocol (Yanik et al., 2008) .
Consequently, based on original authentication protocol, several improved protocols for SIP have been proposed to strength the security and promote the performance of VoIP communications.
In order to overcome the security weakness of the original authentication protocol of SIP, Yang et al. (2005) proposed a SIP authentication protocol based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. In their protocol, a hashed password table was stored at the SIP server side, and the hashed password was used to realize mutual authentication and key agreement. However, Jo et al. (2009) off-line stolen-verifier attacks, Denning-Sacco attacks, and password guessing attacks (Yoon et al., 2010b) . Based on Wu et al.'s protocol, an improved authentication protocol was proposed by Yoon et al. (2010b) to eliminate security flaws. But Gokhroo et al. (2011) indicated that the improved protocol could not resist off-line password guessing attacks and replay attacks too. Recently, Arshad and Ikram (2013) also proposed an authentication protocol based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem for SIP. In order to avoid time-consuming operations, Tsai (2009) adopted a one-way hash function to design an efficient authentication protocol for SIP. Since only one-way hash function and exclusive-or operations were used in their protocol, their protocol reduced computational cost significantly. However, Yoon et al. (2010a) demonstrated that Tsai's protocol could not resist stolen-verifier attacks, off-line password guessing attacks, Denning-Sacco attacks, and failed to achieve perfect forward secrecy. To address these obstacles, Yoon et al. (2010a) proposed a new protocol. Unfortunately, the proposed protocol was vulnerable to stolen-verifier attacks and off-line password guessing attacks (Xie 2012).
Almost all of the authentication protocols mentioned above require storing a password or verification table at the SIP server side. In these protocols, the SIP server verifies the user's identity by using the passwords or hashed passwords stored in its database. The main merit of these authentication protocols is simple. As shown in Fig.1 , since the user's passwords are stored in the SIP server's database, the adversary could launch a stolen-verifier attacks and password guessing attacks to obtain the user's password. Moreover, a privileged-insider of the SIP server could easily steal the identity and password-verifier table from the SIP server and then use these passwords to impersonate a legal user to access other servers. Consequently, these protocols suffer from the insider attack. Furthermore, the required memories of the verification table increase with the number of the registered users. When there are a lot of registered users in the SIP server, the password or verification tables will became very large.
Obviously, the maintenance of the verification table and the password updating process are all energy consuming operations which would limit these protocols' scalability and applicability. Since the verification table stored at the SIP server not only leads to a risk of various attacks but also decreases the applicability for practical use, it should be avoided in the authentication protocol design for green VoIP networks. In order to eliminate the password or verification tables, Yeh et al. (2013) adopted the smartcard to construct an authentication protocol based on ECC for SIP. However their protocol involved the time synchronization problem. Furthermore, the computational cost of the protocol was very high due to 12 times of ECC computation operations were involved. Zhang et al. (2013) also proposed an authenticated key agreement protocol based on ECC to avoid the storage of a verification table at the SIP server side. But Irshad et al. (2014) argued that the protocol was suffered from impersonation attacks and then proposed a single round-trip authentication scheme to overcome security flaws. Unfortunately, their protocol was vulnerable to user impersonation attacks (Arshad and Nikooghadam, 2014) (Farash, 2014; Farash and Attari, 2014) .
Although several attempts have been made to avoid the usage of the verification table, but designing a secure and energy-efficient authenticated key agreement protocol without using the verification table for SIP is still a challenging task. In this study, an efficient authentication protocol for SIP is proposed by using smartcard based on ECC. Since no verification table needs to store in the SIP server's database, the proposed protocol not only enhances the security but also avoids energy consumption for the maintenance of verification tables. In addition, performance analysis demonstrates that the proposed protocol reduces the computational costs in comparison with other related protocols.
Energy-efficient authentication key agreement protocol
In this section, we present our energy-efficient authenticated key agreement protocol of SIP in detail.
The proposed protocol comprises four phases: initialization phase, registration phase, authentication phase, and password changing phase. The notations adopted throughout the rest paper are summarized in Table 1 . Next, our protocol is described in detail as follows, and it is illustrated in Fig. 2 .
Table 1 Notations and Terminology

Ui
User i S SIP server 
IDi
Identity of the user
Initialization phase
In this phase, the SIP server S sets up several security parameters used for authentication and key agreement.
Step S1: The SIP server S selects an elliptic curve equation Step S2: The server S chooses a high entropy random integer s as its secret key and computes pub P sP  .
And then the server S constructs a secure one-way hash function
Step S3: The server S keeps s secret and publishes { ( , ), , ,
p pub E a b P P h  as its public parameters.
Registration phase
When a new user Ui wants to register with the SIP server S, it performs the following process with the SIP server S to complete the registration process.
Step R1:
The user Ui first selects its identity IDi, and its password PWi freely, and chooses a random high entropy random integer r. Next, it selects a one-way hash function
Then, the user U sends {IDi, C1} to the SIP server S over a secure channel.
Step R2:
After receiving the information, the SIP server S computes 2 ( )
h PW r h ID s    by using its secret key s and the received message from the user Ui. After that, the SIP server S records the secure information C3 in the memory of the smart card and delivers this smart card to Ui through a secure channel. Step R3: Upon receiving the smart card, Ui writes r into the smart card secretly. And then the memory of the smart card contains (C3, r).
Authentication phase
During the authentication process, the user Ui and the SIP server S perform the following steps to achieve mutual authentication and key negotiation.
Step A1: Step A2: 
Compute 4 1
Compute 7 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) SK r r P  as the shared session key with the user Ui.
Password changing phase
During the password changing phase, the user Ui can change its password PW freely and securely. The steps of the password changing phase are executed as follows and are shown in Fig. 3 .
Step P1: i U  S (V)
If the user Ui wants to change its password, it chooses a new password with the x-coordinate of elliptic curve point SK as an encryption key encrypts. Finally, the user Ui submits V to the SIP server S.
Step P2: S :
Upon receiving the message, the SIP server S decrypts the received message V by using its session key 
And then it submits W to the user Ui.
Step P3: After receiving the message W, the user Ui decrypts the message and checks whether the authentication tag 
Security analysis
In this section, we evaluate the security of our proposed protocol by analyzing some possible attacks. 
1) Replay attacks
Suppose an adversary Bob obtains previous request message REQUEST (IDi, C4, C6) in Step A1 and replays it to the SIP server S. In the proposed protocol, the SIP server S will detect this replay attack easily Therefore, Bob cannot launch the replay attack successfully in the proposed protocol.
2) Man-in-the-middle attacks
In the proposed protocol, mutual authentication is provided to resist Man-in-the-middle attacks. If an adversary Bob attempts to impersonate Ui to establish an independent connection and share a session key with S, he needs to pass the verification process of the SIP server S. To pass this verification process, Bob needs to generate a valid session key SK. When Bob tries to extract r1 or r2 to construct SK, he faces the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. So Bob cannot pass the verification of the SIP server S. For the same reason, Bob cannot go through the verification process of Ui without the knowledge of SK and the SIP server's secret key s. So he cannot impersonate S to share a session key and make an independent connection with the user Ui.
The above analysis illustrates that the proposed protocol can resist the man-in-middle attack.
3) Modification attacks
Assume that an adversary Bob modifies the REQUEST message and submits the fraud message ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Therefore, the modification attack is invalid in the proposed protocol.
4) Denning-Sacco attacks
Suppose an adversary Bob compromises the previous session key 1 1 3 3 ( ) SK h r P r r P r P  and tries to obtain the user Ui's password PWi and the SIP S's secret key s. Since the session key SK is constructed by three elliptic curve points and is not connected with the user Ui's password PWi or the SIP server's private key s. Bob cannot obtains the secret long-term privacy key PWi or s by compromising an old session key SK. In addition, in each session a fresh session key is generated by using r1P, r1r3P, and r3P, where the integer r1 is chosen by the user Ui and the integer r3 is selected by the SIP server S randomly. Since the session key SK is not connected with each other, the adversary Bob cannot figure out other session keys with an old session key.
Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist Denning-Sacco attacks.
5) Stolen-verifier attacks 15
There is no password or verification table needed to be stored in the SIP server side. Consequently, the adversary Bob cannot steal the user's personal information by launching an attack to obtain the verification table stored in the SIP server database. So, in the authentication process, the adversary cannot impersonate the user Ui to cheat the SIP server S by using the stolen information stored in the SIP server database.
Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the stolen-verifier attack successfully.
6) Offline dictionary attacks without the smart card
If an adversary Bob intends to perform an offline dictionary attack, and he obtains all the messages during the authentication process. Since the messages transmitted between the user Ui and the SIP server S do not include any information about the user Ui's password PWi, the adversary Bob cannot determine whether each of his guessed passwords is correct or not by using the intercepted information.
Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the offline dictionary attack without the smart card. Therefore, the offline dictionary attack with the smart card cannot be launched successfully in the proposed protocol.
8) Insider attacks
Since no password or verification tables are needed to be stored at the SIP server side in the proposed protocol, a privileged-insider of the SIP server cannot access other servers successfully by stealing the identity and password-verifier table from the SIP server S.
Therefore, the proposed authentication process can resist insider attacks successfully.
9) Password disclosure attacks 16
In our protocol, the user Ui submits 1 ( ) i C h PW r   instead of its original password PWi to the SIP server S. Since the real password PWi is protected by a high entropy random integer r, the SIP server S cannot obtain the user U's real password in the registration phase.
Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the password disclosure attack.
10) Session key security
In the proposed protocol, only the user Ui and the SIP server S know the session key at the end of the key negotiation process 1 1 3 3 ( ) SK h r P r r P r P  . This is because Bob cannot correctly guess r1r3P from the intercepted information to construct a valid SK. To generate a valid session key SK, Bob needs to extract r1 from C4 or retrieve r3 from C7, which is equivalent to solving an instance of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. So, the session key SK is not known by anyone but only the user Ui and the SIP server S.
Therefore, session key security is provided in the proposed protocol.
11) Known-key security
In the proposed protocol, the user Ui and the SIP server S choose two random integers r1 and r2 respectively in each session process. Since the two integers are different in every session key negotiation process, the SK of each session is not connected with other session keys. Since a different session key is generated in each session, an adversary Bob cannot figure out another session key
( ) SK h r P r r P r P  by using a compromised session key 1 1 3 3 ( ) SK h r P r r P r P  . So, a unique session key SK is generated between the user Ui and the SIP server S in each run of the authentication process.
Therefore, the proposed protocol provides known-key security successfully.
12) Perfect forward secrecy
Assume that an adversary Bob compromises the user Ui's password PWi and the SIP server S's secret key s. And then it attempts to find the previous session key 1 1 3 3 ( ) SK h r P r r P r P  . However, without the knowledge of r1 or r2, he cannot construct the previous session key SK. This is because the two integers are protected by elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. In addition, Bob cannot extract SK directly from Auths or Authu since it is protected by a one-way hash function. So, even if the user Ui's password PWi and the SIP server S's secret key s are compromised by the adversary Bob, the previous session keys would not be compromised. Therefore, the proposed protocol can provide perfect forward secrecy.
13) Mutual authentication
In the proposed protocol, the user Ui and the SIP server S can verify the identity of each other via Auths and Authu. Therefore, the proposed protocol can provide mutual authentication.
14) Security chosen and update password
In the proposed protocol, the user can freely choose her or his password in the registration phase. In addition, a password updating function is provided for users to change their passwords easily and freely.
Furthermore, even if the smart card was stolen or lost, other person could not change the password without knowing the user's password.
Performance comparisons
In our study, we compared the proposed protocol with other related protocols in terms of functionality and computational cost. Since no password or verification table is stored in the SIP server's database, the proposed protocol avoids energy consumption for maintenance of the verification We also compared the computational cost of the proposed protocol with other related protocols. To simulate a practical environment, the SIP server and the client were installed on two PCs over the local area network in our experiments. The hardware platform for client was Intel Pentium G630 processor with 4 GB memory which offered maximum clock speeds of 2.7 GHz. The Intel G850 processor was adopted at the SIP server side, which offered maximum clock speeds of 2.90 GHz and 4 GB memory.
Furthermore, a NIST/SECG-standard elliptic curve over a 521 bits prime field and SHA-1as a one-way hash function were adopted in our experiments. Then some notations are defined as follows:
(1) Tm: the time for executing a scalar multiplication operation of elliptic curve;
(2) Ta: the time for executing a point addition operation of elliptic curve; (3) Th: the time for executing a one-way hash function (string to number); (4) TH: the time for executing a one-way hash function (string to point);
(5) Tv: the time for executing a modular inversion operation.
As shown in Table 3 , in the registration phase, two hash operations are needed to compute C1 on the user side and C2 on the SIP server side. Since only two hash operations are adopted in the registration phase, the execution time of this process is estimated to be 0.012ms.
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In the authentication phase, the user side needs three scalar multiplication operations of elliptic curve to obtain C4, C5 and r1C7; four hash operations to generate As shown in Fig. 4 , compared with other protocols, Tsai's protocol achieves the best performance, since only one-way hash function and exclusive-or operations are used during the authentication process. 
Conclusion
In this study, we proposed an energy-efficient authentication protocol for SIP without using a verification table. Based on ECC, the proposed protocol realized mutual authentication and key negotiation by using password and smartcard. Sine no password or verification table was required to store at the SIP server side, the proposed protocol avoided the energy consumption for the maintenance of a large verification table. Furthermore, the proposed protocol could resist several attacks associated with verification tables, such as insider attacks, stolen verifier attacks, and password guessing attacks. Security analysis demonstrated that our protocol was more secure than the related protocols. And the experimental results showed that the proposed protocol reduced the computational cost in comparison with the 21 protocols without using verification tables. Therefore, the proposed authentication protocol is more suitable for green VoIP networks.
